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WHILE the increasing federali- zation of crime is becoming the 
subject of much debate, it is not-- 
from the criminal defense stand- 
point-a problem per se. The federal 
criminal justice system has its idi- 
osyncrasies, but criminal defendants 
and defense lawyers must perforce 
operate within that system. Federal 
law has long proscribed a wide range 
of criminal activity, and congressional 
authority exists to reach most crimes.1 
What is problematic for the de- 
fense is the dual jurisdiction that fed- 
eralization enables. Currently, fed- 
eral and state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over a wide variety of 
criminal behavior. Given the possibil- 
ity of prosecution in either jurisdic- 
tion, increased federalization-more 
federal crimes-means more power 
to both state and federal prosecutors, 
who can cooperate to select defen- 
dants for pursuit and who can exploit 
the jurisdictional redundancy to 
their advantage. Moreover, the long- 
standing interpretation of the double 
jeopardy clause that permits sequen- 
tial prosecutions in both state and 
federal court gives an added measure 
of power to prosecutors.2 Yet, even 
this dual jurisdiction could be justi- 
fled: were federal prosecutorial ef- 
forts carefully focused and indictment 
powers directed in specific and dis- 
crete areas, the repetitive authority 
might be rationalized to avoid duplica- 
tive efforts, create economies of scale, 
and perhaps cause a reduction in crimi- 
nal activity. Alternatively, were federali- 
zation ofparticular crimes accompanied 
by disabling state prosecutions (that is, 
if Congress were to give the federal 
courts exclusive, rather than concur- 
rent, jurisdiction over specific crimes), 
focused and nonduplicative deployment 
of resources could result. 
Under the current system, how- 
ever, neither deeply coordinated 
state-federal activities nor unitary 
focused action by either sovereign ex- 
ists. Rather, erratic prosecution of 
and disparate penalties for similarly 
situated defendants are commonplace. 
This article focuses on how and why 
federalization does harm to defen- 
dants that, from a variety of vantage 
points, is cause for objection. 




Questions of the effects on defen- 
dants of dual state and federal juris- 
1. Congress has comprehensive authority 
under the commerce clause to regulate and to 
proscribe various forms of criminal conduct. 
See Kathleen F. Brickey, "The Commerce 
Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two 
Thieves," this issue of The Annals of the Ameri- 
can Academy of Political and Social Science; 
Sara Sun Beale, "Federalizing Crime: Assess- 
ing the Impact on the Federal Courts," ibid. 
2. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
"an act denounced as a crime by both national 
and state sovereignties is an offense against 
the peace and dignity of both and may be 
punished by each." United States v. Lanza, 260 
U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Under the Department 
of Justice's Petite Policy, reprosecution after 
state prosecution for the same act is allowed 
only under compelling circumstances and with 
the approval of the assistant attorney general. 
See Katherine Lowe, "Twenty-Second Annual 
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States 
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991- 
92," Georgetown Law Journal, 81:1029, 1040 
(1993); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 
530-31 (1960) (per curiam). But see H. Scott 
Wallace, "The Drive to Federalize Is a Road to 
Ruin," Criminal Justice, 8:52 (Fall 1993) (re- 
prosecution sometimes occurs when state pun- 
ishment seems too lenient). 
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diction over criminal law must begin 
with the power of Congress to pass 
laws making activities federal of- 
fenses. It turns out that this power is 
almost unlimited, and the catalogue 
of federal crimes, long.3 Over the past 
decades, Congress has defined new 
federal offenses, promulgated in- 
creasingly harsh penalties for both 
new and old federal offenses, and pro- 
vided additional resources for inves- 
tigation and prosecution. 
Congress has not endowed either 
the judiciary or the defense in a par- 
allel fashion. The judicial dislike for 
these congressionally imposed bur- 
dens is well known and documented.4 
Although commentators have de- 
plored the congressional tendency to 
create new crimes5 and have at- 
tempted to articulate principles to 
limit or guide those decisions,6 no re- 
alistic way of constraining the exercise 
of the congressional power exists. 
The bulk of federal offenses has 
long overlapped state laws in defin- 
ing various forms of behavior as 
criminal; as the number of federal 
crimes increases, so does the overlap. 
Drug and weapons offenses provide 
the most obvious examples,7 but a 
series of crimes more readily associ- 
ated with the federal government- 
such as money laundering,s Hobbs 
Act violations (extortion principally),9 
and offenses under the Racketeer In- 
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO)0--are also instances of 
dual jurisdiction, in which either fed- 
eral or state prosecutors or both can 
prosecute individuals. Bank robber- 
ies and almost any fraud that in- 
volves the use of telephones or the 
mail also come simultaneously 
within the state and federal ambits. 
While the federal courts are imag- 
ined by some to be a large system, the 
numbers of courts and judges are 
small as compared to their state 
counterparts." In light of the respec- 
tive sizes of the federal and state 
3. See Brickey, "Commerce Clause and 
Federalized Crime." 
4. See, for example, William H. 
Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the State 
of the Judiciary, p. 2, reprinted in The Third 
Branch, 26:1, 1 (Jan. 1993) ("We can no longer 
afford the luxury of state and federal courts 
that work at cross-purposes or irrationally du- 
plicate one another."); Roger J. Miner, "The 
Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law: 
Overloaded Courts and a Dissatisfied Public," 
Criminal Justice, 4:16 (Spring 1989), p. 16. 
5. Wallace, "Drive to Federalize." 
6. Such principles have been argued for 
in Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, 
"Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Crimi- 
nal Legislation," in this issue of The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science; Philip B. Heymann and Mark H. 
Moore, "The Federal Role in Dealing with Vio- 
lent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and 
Cautions," ibid.; John B. Oakley, "The Myth of 
Cost-Free Jurisdictional Reallocation," ibid. 
See also Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Committee on Long Range Planning, 
Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal 
Courts, Draft for Public Comment (Washing- 
ton, DC: Judicial Conference of the United 
States, 1994), pp. 20-23; Sara Sun Beale, "Too 
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to 
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal 
Jurisdiction," Hastings Law Journal, 46:979, 
1004-18 (1995); Rory Little, "Myths and Prin- 
ciples of Federalization," ibid., 46:1029 (1995). 
7. Most drug offenses are covered by 21 
U.S.C. ?? 841, 960. Weapons offenses are prin- 
cipally covered by 18 U.S.C. ?? 922, 924. Use 
of a firearm in the commission of another crime 
comes under 18 U.S.C. ?? 844, 924, 929. 
8. 18 U.S.C. ?? 1956, 1957. 
9. 18 U.S.C. ? 1951. 
10. 18 U.S.C. ?? 1962, 1963. 
11. For a discussion of the impact of feder- 
alization on the federal courts in light of sta- 
tistical data, see Beale, "Federalizing Crime." 
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systems, it is a given that many, per- 
haps most, federal crimes can and 
will be prosecuted in state courts as 
state crimes. The great bulk of crimi- 
nal prosecutions occur in state 
courts, not only because the number 
of cases is beyond the capacity of the 
federal judiciary (as currently config- 
ured and even if many times en- 
larged) but also because of the re- 
sources of federal prosecutors. Apart 
from crimes against the federal gov- 
ernment (fairly characterized as truly 
federal crimes like treason and in- 
come tax violations), federal prosecu- 
tors can bring only a small percent- 
age of criminal cases in any given 
area of criminal enforcement. In 1990, 
there were 829,344 felony convictions 
in the state courts,12 and 47,494 de- 
fendants convicted in the U.S. dis- 
trict courts.'3 Thus, unless federal 
cases are carefully chosen, federal 
enforcement of crimes defined by 
Congress is likely to be scattershot 
and have relatively little effect upon 
the underlying criminal behavior. 
Even in drug cases, in which the fed- 
eral effort has been highly visible- 
and costly-federal convictions are 
about 6 percent of state and federal 
drug convictions combined.14 
The limited number of federal 
criminal prosecutions, then, can have 
real impact only if there is a national 
policy that sets forth the kinds of 
cases and the kinds of criminals that 
should be the targets of the federal 
effort, and is accompanied by equally 
strong directives not to bring cases 
where the criteria are not met. But 
such national coordination is under- 
cut by the structure of federal prose- 
cution, which is diffused. In practice, 
individual United States Attorneys 
differ widely both in the selection of 
offenders to prosecute and in the 
choice of which crimes to charge. 
While decentralization of federal 
prosecutions may have a good deal to 
commend it in a variety of contexts, 
such localized power does not offer a 
basis upon which to deploy federal 
prosecutors according to carefully 
calibrated national directives. While 
written Department of Justice guide- 
lines exist, no national policy suffi- 
ciently curbs individual prosecutorial 
choices. The result is that there is 
federal prosecution of many crimes 
and of many criminals, indistin- 
guishable from crimes and criminals 
routinely prosecuted by state agencies. 
But to say that federal enforce- 
ment practices vary widely and, in 
large part, end up being duplicative 
of state enforcement does not neces- 
sarily mean that state and federal 
law enforcement agencies pursue to- 
tally independent courses. On the 
contrary, there is already in place a 
close relationship between many fed- 
eral and state law enforcement per- 
sonnel, particularly in drug cases. As- 
sistant United States Attorneys, 
state district attorneys, state and lo- 
cal police and other law enforcement 
personnel, as well as agents of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
12. U.S., Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
1993, ed. Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pas- 
tore (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1994), p. 490. 
13. Ibid., p. 535. 
14. For the year 1990, an estimated 274,613 
adults were convicted on felony drug charges 
in state courts. Federal convictions for drug 
crimes during 1990 numbered 16,311. Ibid., 
pp. 490, 535. 
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Firearms, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, are all routinely cross- 
designated to investigate and prose- 
cute crimes in both state and federal 
courts. Joint state-federal task forces 
abound. State law enforcement offi- 
cials are encouraged to make refer- 
rals for federal prosecution of crimes 
within state jurisdiction. 
One would think that this in- 
creased cooperation by state and fed- 
eral law enforcement personnel could 
provide an atmosphere in which a 
coherent policy could develop about 
when to prosecute in state courts and 
when to prosecute in federal courts. 
No such overall policy has emerged, 
however. All prosecutors have pres- 
sures, including political needs to be 
reactive to criminal activity. Prosecu- 
tors need to be responsive to cooper- 
ating agencies who have done inves- 
tigative work and who want to see 
and report the fruits of such efforts. 
While a degree of cooperation and 
coordination may exist in a particu- 
lar jurisdiction, the overall interre- 
lations have not yielded a holistic 
approach that sorts cases by jurisdic- 
tion, state and federal, or an approach 
that enables nuanced responsiveness 
to local needs. 
EFFECTS ON DEFENDANTS: 
PROSECUTORIAL ADVANTAGES 
Several factors-the probability of 
federal prosecution, the probability 
of double prosecution for the same 
offense, the relative probabilities 
(state and federal) of conviction, and 
the effect of differing state and fed- 
eral sentencing practices-affect 
defendants, about whom one cannot 
speak without also discussing 
prosecutors. 
At one level, given the data on the 
relative capacities of state and fed- 
eral prosecutions, the probability of 
prosecution in federal court, at least 
for most people accused of crimes, is 
always relatively low. The probability 
of double prosecution is also quite 
low-although there are several no- 
table exceptions.15 
Overall instances of federal prose- 
cutions, however, tell only one part of 
the story. Criminal defendants and 
their lawyers often are faced with the 
potential for dual prosecutions or fed- 
eral prosecution. They must always 
"[bargain] in the shadow of the law."'6 
Moreover, once threatened with ac- 
tual federal prosecution, defendants 
face prosecutors who possess awe- 
some power. Conviction either by 
trial or through plea bargaining be- 
comes more certain, and sentence ex- 
posure is generally higher in federal 
court than if a defendant were subject 
only to state prosecution. 
Probability of prosecution 
As noted, in 1990 there were 
274,613 state felony drug offense con- 
victions; in federal courts, 16,311 de- 
fendants were convicted of drug of- 
fenses."7 For violent offenses- 
15. The police officers who battered Rodney 
King, for example, were tried and convicted in 
federal court after state prosecutors failed to 
obtain a conviction. 
16. The quotation is taken from the title of 
Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser's 
article, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce," Yale Law Journal, 
88:950 (1979). 
17. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics 1993, pp. 490, 535. 
Approximately 61 percent of the state drug 
convictions were for trafficking offenses, and 
the remainder for possession charges. Approxi- 
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murder, assault, robbery, and the 
like-there were 147,766 convictions 
in the state courts and 2331 federal 
convictions.18 In the case of property 
offenses-burglary, larceny, fraud-- 
the conviction numbers were 280,748 
for state cases compared to 13,593 for 
federal cases.19 
These kinds of ratios give the im- 
pression that federal prosecutions 
are relatively rare events, but several 
factors can increase the probability of 
federal prosecution of a particular in- 
dividual. First, federal enforcement 
authorities generally have more re- 
sources to spend per case than their 
state counterparts. Thus, in the in- 
stances where state and federal 
authorities are cooperating, federal 
resources are often employed where 
the target is large-scale criminal ac- 
tivity by an organized group. Federal 
prosecutions of organized crime king- 
pins, large-scale drug dealers, and 
white-collar criminals who engage in 
multimillion-dollar fraud schemes 
are cases in point, and there are, in 
fact, plenty of these.20 Organized 
crime cases are especially likely to 
end up in federal court, primarily be- 
cause of the relative ease of convic- 
tion in federal court, as compared 
with many state courts, as will be 
described more fully in this article. 
Yet far from all federal prosecu- 
tions target big-time offenders. Drug 
offenses provide an example. Drug 
offenders make up a large part of the 
recent dramatic increase in the fed- 
eral prison population. In 1980, 
about 18 percent of the 24,000 federal 
prisoners were drug law offenders. In 
1993, about 60 percent of the nearly 
77,000 sentenced inmates were con- 
fined for drug law violations. Of 
these, many did not meet the descrip- 
tion of the so-called drug lord. A De- 
partment of Justice study found that 
some 36 percent of all sentenced drug 
offenders in the federal prison sys- 
tem could be classified as "low-level 
drug law offenders."21 
Why should so many low-level 
drug offenders find their way to fed- 
eral prisons? Why are these low-level 
offenders not turned over to the states 
for prosecution, especially given the 
close cooperation between federal 
and state authorities in drug cases? 
One reason is that low-level drug 
dealers are relatively easy to catch 
and prosecute, and federal agencies 
are understandably eager to demon- 
strate proof of their success in appre- 
hending criminals. Because the low- 
level drug offenders operate mostly 
at street level, "buys" by undercover 
agents and reverse stings22 are rela- 
tively easy to arrange. Street-level 
people end up in federal prisons in 
large numbers because they gener- 
ally know less about the distribution 
organization of which they are a 
part-and thus have less to trade in 
mately 92 percent of the federal convictions 




20. In 1990, there were 996 defendants 
charged with federal racketeering offenses and 
128 charged with continuing criminal enter- 
prise drug offenses. Ibid., pp. 514-15. 
21. Criminal Law Reporter (Bureau of Na- 
tional Affairs) 54:2101, 2109 (16 Feb. 1994). 
22. A reverse sting occurs when a suspected 
drug dealer is persuaded to buy drugs from an 
undercover agent or from an informer who is 
equipped with an electronic voice transmitter, 
or wire. 
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return for lenient treatment23--than 
do higher-ups in the drug ring. The 
combination of very high possible 
sentences for relatively low quanti- 
ties of drugs sold or possessed, and 
wide discretion on the part of federal 
prosecutors to charge crimes with pen- 
alties that span across a wide range, 
means that guilty pleas can be ob- 
tained in a large number of these 
cases, resulting in an increase in the 
conviction ratios, which is used as a 
measure of success by and for. federal 
prosecutors and investigatory agencies. 
While federal prosecutions may be 
rare, once the federal lightning 
strikes, the sentence is likely to be 
much higher than if the defendant 
had been convicted in many state 
courts. Though the ranges of punish- 
ment can vary widely between state 
and federal systems, and although 
many state legislatures are increas- 
ing penalties and imposing three- 
strike provisions, currently the fed- 
eral system has more severe 
sanctions for certain crimes than do 
many states.2 This disparity trans- 
lates into more time in prison for 
defendants who have been prose- 
cuted federally than for state defen- 
dants who commit similar offenses.25 
It also means that state defendants, 
when threatened with federal prose- 
cution, have the added incentive of 
removing the threat of federal prose- 
cution if they agree to plead guilty to 
state charges. 
Ease of conviction 
If a defendant is either the subject 
of a joint state-federal investigation 
or indicted in the federal system, that 
defendant's conviction becomes more 
probable. There are three primary 
reasons for this. First, procedural 
rules in the federal courts make con- 
victions easier for federal prosecutors 
than for their state counterparts. 
Second, prosecutors in the federal 
system have substantial coercive 
power to compel guilty pleas.26 Third, 
23. Under U.S. Sentencing Guideline 
(U.S.S.G.) ? 5K1.1, if a defendant provides the 
government "substantial assistance in the in- 
vestigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense," the court can 
impose a sentence less severe than recom- 
mended by the guidelines, upon the govern- 
ment's motion. One of the criteria for determin- 
ing the appropriate sentence reduction is "the 
court's evaluation of the significance and use- 
fulness of the defendant's assistance, taking 
into consideration the government's evalu- 
ation of the assistance rendered." U.S.S.G. ? 
5K1.1(a) (1). 
24. For additional discussion of federal 
sentencing policy, see Kevin R. Reitz, "The 
Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy," 
this issue of The Annals of the American Acad- 
emy of Political and Social Science. 
25. In 1990, the average length of prison 
sentences imposed on persons convicted of 
drug trafficking offenses in the federal courts 
was 83.1 months, while in state courts, drug- 
trafficking offenders received average sen- 
tences of 52.0 months. Department of Justice, 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
1993, pp. 495, 537. The case of Adewale 
Aladekoba demonstrates that prosecutors 
might prefer federal prosecutions for drug of- 
fenses rather than state murder charges. In 
that case, state murder charges were dropped, 
and during the federal drug trial the prosecu- 
tion was able to demonstrate involvement in 
three murders as part of Aladekoba's drug 
activities. Aladekoba was sentenced to multi- 
ple life terms without the possibility of parole, 
more than he would have received from a state 
prosecution. See Jay Apperson and Marcia My- 
ers, "Prosecutors Increasingly Rely on Federal 
Charges," Baltimore Sun, 9 Apr. 1994; Beale, 
"Too Many and Yet Too Few," pp. 1000-1001. 
26. Some state prosecutors do as well, of 
course, with the advent of three-strike laws. 
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when both federal and state prosecu- 
tors are involved in a criminal inves- 
tigation, the panoply of inducements 
and threats that can be brought to 
bear to extract guilty pleas increases 
substantially. 
Procedural advantages. Federal 
prosecutors enjoy several procedural 
advantages over most of their state 
counterparts.27 One set of issues re- 
lates to grand juries. In many state 
jurisdictions, including New York 
and California, prosecutors cannot 
present hearsay evidence to grand 
juries except in narrowly defined ar- 
eas. Thus accomplices, eyewitnesses, 
and victims must appear personally 
before many state grand juries, 
rather than having an investigating 
agent summarize the testimony of 
these witnesses for the grand jury, as 
is done in the federal system. Conse- 
quently, state prosecutors need to 
spend time and resources preparing 
often unwilling witnesses who must 
appear before a grand jury-not so 
for federal prosecutors, who need 
only prepare the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation or Drug Enforcement 
Administration case agent. Witnesses 
in the federal system may also feel 
more secure because they may well 
escape identification as witnesses when 
their testimony is related, not by them, 
but by a government agent, sworn to 
secrecy for grand jury testimony. 
In some states, defendants have a 
right to a preliminary hearing when- 
ever a charge is brought against 
them. Defense attorneys are given 
the opportunity to cross-examine wit- 
nesses, including reporting officers, 
and they use this opportunity to ob- 
tain discovery about the strength of 
the prosecution's case and to lock 
witnesses into accounts that cannot 
easily be changed later at trial. In 
contrast, in the federal system, 
prosecutors routinely short-circuit 
the preliminary hearing by obtain- 
ing indictments through a grand 
jury,28 depriving the defense of these 
opportunities. 
Another federal advantage is that 
prosecutors can compel testimony by 
the grant of limited, or use, immu- 
nity, meaning that the government 
can still prosecute an immunized wit- 
ness if it can demonstrate that the 
evidence for that prosecution "was 
obtained from a source independent 
from the immunized testimony."29 On 
the other hand, many states, again 
including New York and California, 
allow only the use of transactional 
immunity, meaning that the immu- 
nized witness is protected from 
prosecution for any activity he or she 
testified about in the immunized tes- 
timony. State prosecutors often will 
not risk giving transactional immu- 
nity to a witness when that witness 
might be involved more deeply in the 
offense being investigated than in- 
itially appears or when the immu- 
nized witness may be involved in an- 
other offense that might be 
27. I am indebted to the article by John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. and John Gleeson, "The Federali- 
zation of Organized Crime: Advantages of Fed- 
eral Prosecution," Hastings Law Journal, 46: 
1029 (1995), for most of the following examples. 
28. The Federal Rules of Criminal Proce- 
dure provide for preliminary hearings, but 
these hearings are not available to defendants 
if the prosecutor decides to obtain an indict- 
ment through the grand jury. 
29. Charles H. Whitebread, An Analysis of 
Constitutional Cases and Concepts (Mineola, 
NY: Foundation Press, 1980), p. 262. 
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inadvertently touched upon in a 
grand jury investigation. 
Turning to trials, state rules gen- 
erally do not allow convictions based 
on accomplice testimony alone but 
require independent corroborative 
evidence linking the defendant to the 
crime.3" Moreover, the corroboration 
requirement often cannot be avoided 
by the interlocking testimony of sev- 
eral accomplices.31 In contrast, fed- 
eral rules allow conviction on the un- 
corroborated testimony of an 
accomplice.32 Given that higher-ups 
in sophisticated criminal enterprises 
often operate behind the scenes and 
limit their contacts with lower eche- 
lons, co-conspirator testimony may 
be the only way to make a case, leav- 
ing state prosecutors limited oppor- 
tunities for getting convictions 
against the most culpable offenders 
in at least some cases of this type. 
RICO33 is yet another coercive 
weapon in the federal arsenal. When 
the threat of RICO is combined with 
the absence of a requirement of cor- 
roboration, federal prosecutors have 
a powerful lever for obtaining convic- 
tions. Convictions under RICO re- 
quire proof merely that a defendant 
is a member of an organization that 
engaged in a pattern of racketeering 
activity, and such a pattern can be 
proved by as few as two predicate 
acts. Given that uncorroborated ac- 
complice testimony about a defen- 
dant's participation in one or another 
of the predicate acts can be sufficient 
for conviction, RICO indictments put 
tremendous pressure on defendants. 
Plea bargaining. In addition to 
relative ease of conviction, the adop- 
tion within the federal system of a 
guideline sentencing scheme, to- 
gether with the proliferation of man- 
datory minimum sentences, has 
given prosecutors enormous power in 
plea negotiations.34 Broadly speak- 
ing, federal prosecutors have more 
control over sentencing than ever be- 
fore. Judges no longer have the dis- 
cretion to select and impose a 
sentence within wide boundaries of 
statutory maxima and minima. 
Rather, sentencing is now carried out 
in accordance with guidelines prom- 
ulgated by the United States Sen- 
tencing Commission. 
Because judges have limited 
authority to depart from these con- 
gressionally mandated Sentencing 
Guideline ranges, federal prosecutors 
can manipulate the guidelines up- 
ward or downward by deciding what 
crimes to charge, by controlling the 
information that is furnished to sen- 
tencingjudges, by promising rewards 
for cooperation, or by threatening to 
indict on every conceivable charge. 
The charging decision, of course, di- 
rectly affects the calculation of the 
offense category. For example, a typi- 
cal range for a drug offender with one 
prior felony conviction who had im- 
ported four kilos of cocaine might be 
108-35 months.35 But a prosecutor 
30. Jeffries and Gleeson, "Advantages," 
pp. 15-20. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 495 (1917); United States v. Gordon, 987 
F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1993). 
33. 19 U.S.C. ?? 1961 et seq. 
34. See Dennis E. Curtis, "Mistretta and 
Metaphor," Southern California Law Review, 
66:607, 608-11 (1992); "Symposium on Federal 
Sentencing," Southern California Law Review, 
66:99 (1992). 
35. U.S.S.G. ? 2D1.1 (amount of cocaine 
imported) and ? 4A1.1 (criminal history). 
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might, in a drug indictment, put in or 
leave out an allegation that a sale or 
a buy took place within 1000 feet of a 
school, thus exposing the defendant 
to a guideline range of 135-68 months, 
or the possibility of about three years 
of added incarceration. 
Federal sentences are often depen- 
dent upon the amount of the illegal 
substance involved in a drug convic- 
tion or the amount of money involved 
in a fraud offense. Information on the 
amount of drugs or money involved in 
a series of illegal deals, for example, 
might be purposefully underesti- 
mated by the prosecutor in docu- 
ments presented to the judge, yield- 
ing a lower offense category under 
the guidelines. On the other hand, by 
presenting testimony of a myriad of 
drug deals, the prosecutor can maxi- 
mize the amount of drugs involved, 
greatly increasing the guideline range. 
Mandatory minimum sentences 
for certain crimes" strengthen the 
federal prosecutor's hand even fur- 
ther. For example, prosecutors who 
decide not to charge a gun count--the 
use of a gun in the commission of a 
drug offense, for instance--can allow 
defendants to escape a mandatory 
minimum five-year sentence con- 
secutive to whatever is imposed in 
connection with the underlying of- 
fense. Conversely, the prosecutor's 
decision to include a count that car- 
ries a mandatory minimum sentence 
often years, twenty years, or life puts 
tremendous pressure upon the most 
stouthearted of defendants, whether 
innocent or guilty. Also, in the guide- 
line scheme, rewards for cooperation 
are almost completely controlled by 
the prosecutor. With few exceptions, 
judges cannot reward cooperation 
with a reduced sentence without a 
motion by the prosecutor requesting 
such a reward.37 
In the event that a prospective 
criminal defendant becomes the sub- 
ject of a joint federal-state investiga- 
tion, even stronger pressures can be 
brought to bear. There will always be 
a differential between state and fed- 
eral laws as to the sentencing expo- 
sure. In most cases, the prospective 
federal sentence will be harsher. 
Also, state sentencing systems are 
currently more flexible than the fed- 
eral system and are likely to remain 
so, allowing probation, for example, 
when probation is not available in the 
federal system. Finally, as noted ear- 
36. The vast majority of mandatory mini- 
mum sentences are imposed under four stat- 
utes dealing with drugs and possession of fire- 
arms in certain crimes: 21 U.S.C. ?? 841, 844, 
960, and 924(c). See Kathleen F. Brickey, 
"Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of 
American Criminal Law," Hastings Law Jour- 
nal, 46:1135, 1148-50 (1995). Mandatory mini- 
mums have in fact affected all federal sen- 
tences, however, through their incorporation 
into the Sentencing Guidelines. Guideline sen- 
tence levels were set so that sentences imposed 
under the guidelines would be longer than 
those required by the mandatory minimums 
for all but the least culpable offenders. The 
mandatory minimum sentences are thus re- 
ally a floor for sentencing under the guidelines. 
Barbara S. Vincent and Paul J. Hofer, The 
Consequences of Mandatory Minimum Prison 
Terms: A Summary of Recent Findings (Wash- 
ington, DC: Federal Judicial Center, 1994), p. 3. 
37. 18 U.S.C. ? 3553(e), entitled "Limited 
authority to impose a sentence below a statu- 
tory minimum," provides for such authority 
only upon motion of the government. A recent 
amendment contained in the 1994 Crime Bill 
allows judges to impose less than the manda- 
tory minimum term for nonviolent drug crimes 
by offenders with minor criminal histories. 
Pub. L. No. 103-322 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 
1985 (1994). 
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lier, conviction at trial in most cases 
will be more probable in federal court. 
Because of dual jurisdiction, state 
prosecutors are the beneficiaries of 
all of the federal prosecutorial advan- 
tages, including the harsher federal 
sentencing system. In this way, they 
share either directly or indirectly the 
power of federal prosecutors. The 
very existence of dual systems casts 
a shadowy threat of federal prosecu- 
tion in almost every case, even 
though the number of federal prose- 
cutions is actually small compared 
with state prosecutions. In the in- 
stance when the two sovereigns do 
collaborate, great pressure can be ap- 
plied. A defendant confronted by a 
state-federal joint task force has a 
difficult decision to make: for exam- 
ple, should the defendant plead guilty 
in state court and have a guaranteed 
three-year sentence, or should the de- 
fendant go to trial in federal court un- 
der an indictment that would entail a 
sentence of thirty years? 
THE HARMS THAT FLOW 
That defendants have hard choices 
is not intrinsically bad. If one viewed 
defendants as likely to be culpable, 
the system that has been sketched 
here could well be applauded. Should 
one worry about the power of prose- 
cutors to coerce guilty pleas or be 
concerned with the sentencing dis- 
parity that results from dual criminal 
jurisdiction? When someone commits 
a crime, does that offender have a 
right to be prosecuted in the more 
lenient jurisdiction, or do criminals 
simply have to take their chances? 
The answers, I think, come not 
only from the defense perspective but 
from everybody's point of view. A fair 
criminal justice system should dis- 
tinguish between degrees of culpabil- 
ity. There is an interest in punishing 
the worst actors more harshly and, 
conversely, in providing opportuni- 
ties for the innocent to have an effec- 
tive way to protest indictments and 
to defend themselves. There is also 
an interest in not concentrating too 
great a set of powers in government 
and in creating incentives for 
thoughtful and efficient government 
action against individuals who have 
committed criminal offenses. At a 
minimum, then, at least some of the 
purposes of the criminal justice sys- 
tem should be to avoid convicting the 
innocent, to convict the guilty only of 
what can be proven that they did, to 
sentence the convicted offender in 
proportion both to the seriousness of 
the crime and the offender's culpabil- 
ity in the crime, and to expend public 
resources wisely. 
Thus the complaints about the cur- 
rent duplicative, overlapping, and co- 
operative system are that, at the mar- 
gins, more defendants will be convicted 
of crimes that they did not commit- 
even though they may have committed 
some lesser or different crimes-and 
more innocent people will be convicted 
and punished. Moreover, for those con- 
victed, sentence disparity will be the 
rule rather than the exception. Those 
defendants selected to receive federal 
convictions and long federal sentences 
are the unfortunates who, almost by 
happenstance, come within the fed- 
eral system. 
That the criminal justice system is 
not always fair is not news. But the 
sort of conviction and sentencing dis- 
parity that occurs as the result of 
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dual criminal jurisdiction is objec- 
tionable on grounds not often dis- 
cussed: the criminal justice system 
should be fair not only as an abstract 
matter but because the justice sys- 
tem has the obligation to teach re- 
sponsibility and evenhandedness. 
When participants in the system- 
defendants, attorneys, witnesses, law 
enforcement agents-perceive that the 
system is erratic and unfair, harm is 
done to those participants as well as 
to the public at large. When a less 
culpable offender receives a sentence 
much harsher than his or her supe- 
rior in a criminal conspiracy, or a 
conviction on a count in which he or 
she was not involved, that person's 
sense of basic justice and respect-- 
how to treat other people-must be 
affected, even if only minimally or at 
the margins.38 
A second argument against the 
grant of so much power to prosecu- 
tors as is enjoyed currently by fed- 
eral-and, derivatively, state-prose- 
cutors is that defendants should be 
able to plea-bargain with a realistic 
chance of a discount depending upon 
the strength of the prosecution's case. 
Dual jurisdiction defeats that goal. 
One might respond that defendants 
should be charged with what the 
prosecutor believes that they did, and 
should not receive discounts depend- 
ing upon whether or not they are 
perceived as difficult to convict. Ac- 
cepting the merit in that argument 
does not, however, end discussion. 
The difficulty of conviction reflects at 
least in some sense a doubt of actual 
guilt, that is, "if we can't prove it, 
maybe they didn't do it, or didn't do 
all of it, or didn't have too much to do 
with it." Moreover, both state and fed- 
eral judiciaries are deeply dependent 
on plea bargaining; removing all incen- 
tives for compromise takes the bar- 
gaining out of pleading guilty. 
Does the current system go so far 
as to obviate prosecutors' need to bar- 
gain? Will prosecutors not always 
give better deals to defendants about 
whom convictions seem less sure? 
The answer is yes, but with a sub- 
stantial caveat. As the balance tips 
further, as procedural and substan- 
tive law protections for defendants 
become increasingly illusory, the cor- 
relation between deals offered to de- 
fendants and the probability of con- 
viction at trial are reduced. 
CONCLUSION 
Dual jurisdiction-overlapping, 
redundant, and cooperative-in a 
context of severe and disparate sen- 
tencing possibilities, together with 
wide prosecutorial discretion and the 
pressures of production, push partici- 
pants away from balanced, consid- 
ered judgment. The prospect of such 
unbridled governmental power, even 
when exercised by people with the 
best of motives, should cause all of us 
deep concern. 
38. In what is becoming a well-cited exam- 
ple, a drug defendant in Philadelphia was of- 
fered a plea bargain by local prosecutors re- 
quiring a 4-8 year sentence. When the 
defendant turned down the offer, the local and 
federal prosecutors decided to bring the 
charges in federal court, where because of two 
prior convictions, the defendant received a 
mandatory life sentence. At sentencing, the 
judge stated, "Yeah, there are people who are 
worse than you out on the street. But you're 
here, and you're going to jail. And the law says 
you have to go to jail for the rest of your life." 
Jim Smith, "Petty Pusher Goes Out Big Time," 
Philadelphia Daily News, 17 July 1992. 
